JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Abstract. Let a committee of voters be considering a finite set A = {al, a2, , am} of alternatives for election. Each voter is assumed to rank the alternatives according to his preferences in a strict linear order. A social choice function is a rule which, to every finite committee of voters with specified preference orders, assigns a nonempty subset of A, interpreted as the set of "winners". A social choice function is consistent if, whenever two disjoint committees meeting separately choose the same winner(s), then the committees meeting jointly choose precisely these winner(s). The function is symmetric if it does not depend on the names of the various voters and the various alternatives. It is shown that every symmetric, consistent social choice function is obtained (except for ties) in the following way: there is a sequence sI, S2, * * , Sm of m real numbers such that if every voter gives score si to his ith most preferred alternative, then the alternative with highest score (summed over all voters) is the winner.
1. Introduction. A collective decision process may be described in the following terms. A group of individuals-a committee or electorate, for exampleis presented with a number of alternatives (motions, or candidates) and the committee members (called voters) are to decide collectively which alternatives are best. It is assumed that, by debate, natural predisposition, and so forth, each voter arrives at some ordering of the alternatives in accordance with his preferences. For the present discussion we shall assume that each such preference order p is a linear order, i.e., a complete, irreflexive, transitive relation on the set of alternatives A = {a1, a2, * , am}. We shall represent p by a column vector where the top alternative is most preferred. A given assignment of preference orders to the voters from a finite set V will be called a preference profile for V. A social choicefunction of order m is then a function that assignes to every preference profile a nonempty subset of the m-set, A, called a choice set. This notion is to be distinguished from a social preference function, which associates with each profile a complete (weak) social ordering of the alternatives. When there are only two alternatives to choose from, the method of simple majority rule seems to be the most natural and commonly used social choice function. But for three or more alternatives there is no completely natural extension of simple majority rule, as was pointed out nearly two centuries ago by the Marquis de Condorcet [3] . As a result, a great variety of rules are used in practice for group decision making when three or more alternatives are involved.
These include the following methods: plurality, Borda, Condorcet, sequential voting (as in the U.S. House of Representatives), exhaustive voting, and double election, to name but a few. For a discussion of some of these methods see Black [2] .
What is needed is an axiomatic framework for comparing the merits of these various methods. This type of study was begun by Arrow [1] , who identified a set of conditions that permit only dictatorship when three or more alternatives are involved. This result (and later refinements of it) tell us much about what cannot be done, but leaves open the problem of defining what can be done. In the case of social choice functions on two alternatives, some additional results have been obtained, notably by May [5] , who characterized simple majority rule by a very pleasing set of axioms, and by Fishburn [4] , who characterized the socalled representative systems. In [4] , Fishburn also investigates extensively other aspects of social choice functions, but in general he does not consider the effects of varying the size of the electorate, which will be one of our chief interests.
The object of this paper is to study two natural conditions on social choice functions, and to describe precisely the family of all functions satisfying these two conditions.
To agree on notation, let N, the set of nonnegative integers, constitute names for the voters, and let Y denote the set of m! distinct preference orders on the alternative set A. A is assumed to be fixed throughout this paper. For any finite V c i, a profile is simply a function from V to Y, and a social choice function (abbreviated SCF) is a function from the set X of all profiles to the family of nonempty subsets of A. A social choice function is said to be anonymous if it depends only on the number of voters associated with each preference order. We can represent the domain of an anonymous SCF by Nm!, i.e., the set of all m!-tuples with nonnegative integer coordinates, indexed by Y, where for any x E Nm! and peY , xp represents the number of voters having preference order p. The zero vector in Nm! represents the case of no voters the empty society.
Let Sm be the group of permutations of the index set {1, 2, , m}. Each a E Sm induces permutations (which we also denote by a) of the alternatives, and hence of the profiles, in the natural way. We say that a SCF f is neutral if f o a = a o f for all a e Sm. Iff is both anonymous and neutral, it is said to be symmetric. Symmetry simply means that the various voters and the various alternatives are treated equally, i.e., without bias. This seems to be a very natural requirement for most group decision situations.
Iff is a symmetric SCF with domain Nm! (indexed by Y) then the permutation of coordinates of Nm! induced by a can be conveniently represented by a permutation matrix M., and we have (1) f (M,(x)) = c(f (x)) for all x E Nml.
Notice that if f is symmetric and x is a fixed point of M, . then by (1), f(x) must be fixed by all powers of a, and hence may be multiple-valued.
Suppose that each of two individuals, 1 and 2, would choose ai over all other alternatives if the choice were made by him alone. The Pareto principle then asserts that ai should be the unique choice of the group consisting of individuals 1 and 2 together. We may extend this notion by requiring that, if A' is the choice of a voter group V', and A" is the choice set of another voter group V" disjoint from V', and if A' n A" # 0, then the group V' U V" should choose precisely the alternatives in A' n A". Indeed, in the opinion of both groups, any alternative in A' n A" is at least as "good" as any other alternative, while any alternative not in A' n A" is not as "good" as any alternative in A' n A", in the opinion of at least one of the groups. Any SCF with the above property will be called consistent. (This notion was originally introduced in [8] .) Independently, a similar notion for social preference functions has been considered by Smith [7] . If f is anonymous, then the consistency condition can be expressed very simply as follows: for all x', x" E Nm, (2) f (x' + x") = f (x') n f (x") whenever f (x') n f(x") # 0.
2. Scoring functions. One of the most commonly used social choice functions is the so-called plurality function, in which each voter casts one vote for his most preferred alternative, and the alternative(s) with the largest total number of votes constitute the choice set. We may think of this procedure as assigning a score of 1 to each voter's most preferred alternative, a score of 0 to the others, and selecting the alternative(s) with highest total score, summed over all voters.
A second well-known SCF is the Borda function, which is defined for m alternatives as follows: let each voter assign score m -1 to his most preferred alternative, score m -2 to his second most preferred alternative, and in general score m -i to his ith most preferred alternative. Then the alternative(s) with highest total score define the choice set for the Borda function.
These two SCF's are examples of the following general class. Given m alternatives and a profile, assign a score of si (si a real number) to each voter's ith most preferred alternative, and let the choice set consist of the alternative(s) with highest total score. Any SCF obtained in this way will be called a simple scoring function, and denoted by fs, where s is the m-vector (s1, S2' , sm). s is called a scoring vector.
Formally, we may define fS on the domain lm! (in fact, on Rm!) as follows. Given peg-, let Ep be the m x m permutation matrix with "1" in the (i,j)th position if and only if ai is jth most preferred in the preference order p. For every x E Rm!, define D(x) = Epc xpEp and let Di(x) denote the ith row of D(x). Then fS is defined by ai E f s(x) if and only if Di(x) * s > Dj(x) * s for all j, 1 < j < m.
Except that we make no requirement that a scoring vector satisfy s, > S2 >... > sm, our definition of a simple scoring function is a special case of Fishburn's notion of a summation function [4] .
The trivial SCF is that f such that f(x) = A for all profiles x. The trivial function can be represented by the simple scoring function f(O, ? ).
If f and g are SCF's such that f(x) c g(x) for all profiles x, we say that f is a refinement of g and writef < g. (f < g if f < g andf : g.) For any anonymous SCF g and scoring vector s E fRm, f s o g, the composition off with g, is defined by ai efs g(x) if and only if ai E g(x) and Di(x) s > Dj(x) s, whenever aj E g(x).
The meaning of fS o g is that the function fs is used to resolve ties produced by g. Applying (3) 3. Extension of domain. Let f be symmetric and consistent. We now show how to extend f in a natural way from the domain Nm! to (Qm!, where Q is the set of all rationals. In other words, we shall extend f to profiles having fractional and negative numbers of voters.
Let e e Nm! be the vector with "1" in every component. By symmetry, f (ne) = A for all n E RN. Now define f (x -ne) = f (x) for each n E RN. This is welldefined, because if x' -n'e = x -ne, then without loss of generality, n' _ n and
ne). This extends f to
Zm! (where Z is the set of all integers) and it is the unique extension of f to Zm! that is symmetric and consistent on Zm!. For any positive integer n, and x E Zm!, consistency implies that f (nx) = f (x), that is, f is homogeneous. Now for each positive integer n define f(x/n) = f(x). This is well-defined, because if x/n = x'ln', then f(x/n) = f (x) = f(n'x) = f (nx') = f(x') = f (x'/n'). This extends f to m!, and it is the unique such extension that is symmetric and consistent on .m! Can a symmetric, consistent f be further extended to Rm! so as to be symmetric and consistent? In ? 5 we will show that this can be done, but not necessarily uniquely. For example, the scoring functionsf(v 2 a1) andf(1' 0, 0)f f (3 a are symmetric and consistent on the domain R 3!, and equal on Q3!, but not everywhere equal on R 3!. To guarantee uniqueness of the real extension, we need, in addition to symmetry and consistency, the following "continuity" concept. An anonymous f is said to be continuous if, whenever f(x) = {ai}, then for any profile y there is a sufficiently large integer n such that f(y + nx) = {ai} for all n' ? n. Thus, continuity is a kind of "domination by large numbers" principle. It means that if a certain committee chooses a unique winner ai (using f), then given any second committee disjoint from the first, we can replicate the first committee a sufficient number of times so that it will overwhelm the second committee in a combined vote and yield the unique winner {ai}
The SCF f(1'0'0) is continuous, while f (0 1O) o f(100) is not. To see the latter, let x be the profile defined by xp = 1 if For any x, y e Ri, and rational 2 such that 0 < 2 < 1, we have ai e f(2x) and aief((1 -A)x),sobyconsistencyai ef(x + (1 -2)y),thatis,2x + (1 -2)yeR .
In general, we say that a set S c DR' is Q-convex if S c Q' and for all x, y E S, and all rational 2, 0 < A < 1, we have Ax + (1 -2)ye S. Thus, each Ri is Qconvex, and in fact is a Q-convex cone, since x E Ri implies Ax E Ri for all rational 2 > 0. To characterize all symmetric and consistent f, we shall need several facts about convex and 0-convex sets. For S c DR", let cvx S denote the convex hull of S, aff S the affine hull of S, and 3 the closure of S. If S c W c DR", where W is a flat (affine set), let intw S denote the interior of S relative to W, and ri S = intaff s S the relative interior of S. The dimension of S, dim S, is the dimension of aff S. We shall use the following well-known facts: if C is convex, then C and ri C are convex and ri C = ri C, ri C = C. Assume that among all expressions (4) for a that k is smallest. and we shall show that )i E Q, 1 < i < k. Letting 20 = -1, q? = q, we can rewrite (4) as (ii) A social choice function is symmetric, consistent and continuous if and only if it is a simple scoring function.
Proof. The "if" parts are left to the reader. To prove the converses, let f be symmetric and consistent; we may take the domain of f to be Gm!. We show first that, where D is the function defined in ? 2,
f(x) = A for all x in R = {xe QlGm!:D(x) = 0}.
If (7) is false, then m ? 2 and without loss of generality (8) f (x?) = {a1, a2, * * * , ar} for some r < m and xo E R. Since m > 2 R, has some face of dimension dim R -1. Hence for some j # i, dim (Ri n R1) = dim R -1, and by symmetry this holds for all i : j.
Hence ui' is the unique modulus-one vector satisfying (9), so
for all permutations a.
Assume now that m > 3, and let V = aff(R1 n R2). Choose xo cintZK3, and let y = xo + M(12)(xo). Then y e intk R3 and u12 y = M(12)(u12 _ y) = u21 y = -u12 y, so ye V-(R1 AR2). Hence R1 nR2 has a (dimR -2)-dimensional face of form R1 n R2 n Rk. By symmetry, we may assume k= 3. Then u12 , u23, u1 are all in R and orthogonal to R1 nR2 n R3, so they are dependent:
(12) 2u12 + ,'u23 + 2,"u31 = 0, 2, 2', 2" are not all zero.
u12 , u23 , u31 cannot all be equal because if they were, then (11) would imply that uj -+u12 for all i 1 j, whence there could be at most two distinct regions Ri, contrary to the assumption that m ? 3. Let a = (1 2 3) ; then there is an index pe-Y such that the restrictions u12, u23, a3' of u12, u23, u31 to the coordinates p, c(p), a2(p) are not all equal. Since these restrictions are also dependent, they lie in a 2-dimensional plane through the origin, and they are permuted in a 3-cycle by the corresponding restriction of M, (which is just a rotation of R3 = {(xp, X'J(p), X,2(p))} having axis (1, 1, 1) ). Hence U12, j23 U31 are distinct and 1u12 + u23 + a31 = 0. Since 2iu12 + 'au23 + 2"i'3l = 0, the fact i'i's are distinct implies 2 = 2' = 2" # 0. Hence (13) u 12 + u23 + U31 = o By (11), the vector u12 is invariant under all permutations M:, where a fixes 1 and 2. Hence u12 has the same value sij for all preference orders p in which al is ranked ith, a2 is ranked jth. Let gij be the set of all such p. Also, put sii = 0. Then ui' =-uji and (13) But u12 e R and u12 u12 > 0, so this is a contradiction. Thus (7) is true. (Note that in case m = 1 or m = 2, (7) is obvious.)
'). Thus, f(x) depends only on D(x)
. By definition, the image of D consists of all rational, linear combinations of m x m permutation matrices. By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, this is precisely the space 9 of all rational m x m matrices with constant row and column sums. Henceforth we shall regard 9 as the effective domain of f.
Since the trivial function is a simple scoring function, we may assume that f is nontrivial. Redefine R = 9, Ri = {D e -9:ai ef(D)}, then apply the argument of (8(1 1) . El Notice that every scoring function actually defines not just a choice set, but in a natural way it weakly orders the whole set of alternatives. Thus, by requiring a social choice function to be symmetric and consistent, we force it in effect to be a social preference function.
Since every scoring function of order m is defined, symmetric and consistent on Rml we have the following. COROLLARY 1. Every symmetric, consistent SCF has a symmetric, consistent real extension. COROLLARY 2. Every symmetric, consistent, continuous SCF has a unique consistent, continuous real extension, and this extension is symmetric.
Proof. If f is symmetric, consistent and continuous, then f(x) = fs(x) for all x E Gm! and some s E lRm. Let g be a consistent, continuous real extension of fS, and let Ri = {x E Rm: ai efs(x)}, Ti = {x E Rm: ai E g(x)}. Now Ri is closed, convex, and intRm! R, 0, so Ri is the closure of its rational points. Thus Ri = (Ri n Qm!) = (Ti n Q!) a Ti.
In particular, intRm! Ti # 0; so Ti convex implies (Ti nf m!) = Ti, whence Ri = T7 andfs = g. E 6. Rational equivalence. It is possible for two different composition series g = fsat 0 fSol ... o fs' and h = f 'ofth il o fp to represent the same social choice function in the sense that g(x) = h(x) for all x E Nm!. In this event we in fact must have g(x) = h(x) for all x E Gm! (see ? 3), and we say that g is rationally equivalent to h, written g -h. If moreover g(x) = h(x) for all x E Rm!, then g is equivalent to h, and we write g h. A subcomposition series of g is a composition series obtained by deleting some nonempty subset of the terms fsI, 1 ? /B < ?, leaving the others in the given order. (The deletion of all fS" can be considered to result in the trivial function.) g is rationally irreducible if g is not trivial and g , g' is false for every subcomposition series g' of g. g is irreducible if g t g' is false for every such g'. In this section we shall exhibit necessary and sufficient conditions that any two (rationally) irreducible composition series be (rationally) equivalent.
We shall take the domain of all scoring functions to be 9, the set of all real m x m matrices with constant row and column sums (9 denotes the set of all rational such matrices).
First we note that, if e represents the m-vector with "1" in every component, then for any s E Rm and i, i e DR, i > 0, we have fS fis+ I". In particular, we may assume, without loss of generality in the results that follow, that in any composition series the so, 1 < , < a, are chosen so that lsfl= s-= 0. We shall also assume that m > 2, since for m = 1 all SCF's are trivial.
With g and h as above, define UO = VO = Qm, and for all y, 1 < y ? a, let Proof. Under our hypotheses the whole proof of Theorem 2 may be carried out in Om rather than Rm. Hence, in particular, V* becomes the Q-subspace generated by tl, t2, , ty and U* the Q-subspace generated by sl, s2 7. The Borda function. We say that a SCFf has the cancellation property if, whenever x is a profile such that the number of voters preferring ai to aj equals the number preferring aj to a, for all pairs ai = aj, then f(x) = A. Any profile of this type will be called balanced. We say that a SCF is faithful if the choice set for a single individual is the singleton set consisting of that individual's most preferred alternative. In other words, a SCF is faithful if "socially most preferred" and "individually most preferred" have the same meaning when society consists of a single individual.
The Borda function of order m is the simple scoring function fs defined by s = (m, m -1, 2, 2,1). Clearly, any m-vector s for which s1 > s2 and si -Si+I = +1-Si+2 for 1 < i < m -2 defines the same function. THEOREM 3. For any fixed number m of alternatives, there is one and only one social choice function that is neutral, consistent, faithful, and has the cancellation property-namely, Borda's function.
Proof. The Borda function clearly has the given properties. Conversely, let f have these properties. As shown in [8, Lemma 5] , any SCF that is consistent and has the cancellation property is anonymous. Hence f is symmetric and consistent, so it is representable by a scoring function on the domain lm!, say 
